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Placing the Anti-Monopoly Commission in the Anti-Monopoly Law’s Driving Seat
“No country in the world appoints so many administrative departments to enforce a law to
protect market competition. Without a unified and authoritative law enforcement organ, it will
be difficult to effectively enforce the Antimonopoly Law.” – Professor Wang Xiaoye1

I.

Introduction

Although China’s history dates back many centuries, its laws pertaining to anticompetitive,
or antitrust, behavior in its economy are relatively young. For example, one of the first laws
relating to competition was adopted only twenty years ago, in 1993.2 This may not be surprising
given the country’s economic policy: why would a socialist market economy require laws about
competition?
China’s decision to shift away from a centrally planned economy towards a market economy
in the late 1970s led to the gradual introduction of competition legislation and regulation.3
However, this development occurred in a piecemeal fashion because of the challenges that
accompanied introducing economic competition concepts in a country whose previous economic
policies included little, if any, antitrust notions.4 A handful of very specific competition laws
and regulations were passed after 1992, but it was only after a 13 year drafting period that a
comprehensive competition law, the Anti-Monopoly Law (“the AML”), was passed on August

1

Zhang Xian-Chu, An Anti-Monopoly Legal Regime in the Making in China as a Socialist Market Economy, 43 Int’l
Law. 1469, 1479 n73 (2009) (citing Liu, Lu, Anti-monopoly Draft Provokes Debate, ChinaDaily, Nov. 15, 2006,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-11/15/content_733279.htm).
2
Shang Ming, Antitrust in China –a constantly evolving subject, 5 Competition L. Int’l 4, 11 (2009) (stating that the
AUCL of the People’s Republic of China was adopted in 1993.).
3
Ming, supra note 2, at 4-5.
4
Xian-Chu, supra note 1, at 14710-1471.
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30, 2007, by the 10th Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC). 5 This
law came into effect on August 1, 2008.6
The AML covers three types of monopolistic conduct: it prohibits certain monopolistic
agreements between entities, it prohibits abuse by an entity of its dominant market position, and
it provides a new review scheme on anticompetitive grounds for certain mergers, acquisitions,
and other business transactions.7 It is enforced both administratively and judicially.8 Its
administrative enforcement is described as a “two-level anti-monopoly institutional structure”:
the Anti-Monopoly Commission (“the AMC”), created by the AML in 2007, formulates and
coordinates enforcement among the anti-monopoly enforcement agencies (“the AMEAs”), which
are antitrust offices within the Ministry of Commerce (“the MOFCOM”), the National
Development and Reform Commission (“the NDRC”), and the State Administration for Industry
and Commerce (“the SAIC”).9
Literature on the AML can be divided into two groups.10 The first group focuses on the
law’s legislative history, and highlights obstacles to the law’s efficacy given its enforcement
structure. This set of literature criticizes the administrative enforcement structure, both before
and after the ministries constituting the AMEAs were formally announced. Some scholars
suggest that to be effective the AML should be enforced through an independent government
institution, while others suggest that the AMEAs should be led by an advisory committee. The
second set of literature focuses on a specific part of the AML, the new merger review process.

5

Ming, supra note 2, at 4.
Id.
7
Nathan Bush, Anticipating Chinese Antitrust Policy, 35 China Bus. Review 46, 47 (2008).
8
Angela Huyue Zhang, The enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China: An institutional design perspective,
56 The Antitrust Bulletin 631, 633-638 (2011).
9
Adam Bobrow, Seth Dilworth, James V. Feinerman & Samuel J. Frederick, China, 42 Int’l L. 945, 954 (2008);
Norton Rose Group, Antimonopoly Law in China(March 2012), 1, 8, http://www.nortonrose.com/files/downloadantimonopoly-law-in-china-63824.pdf.
10
Separating the literature on the AML into these two groups reflects this author’s opinion.
6
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This second group analyzes guidelines, regulations, and decisions related to the merger regime in
order to predict the future application of the merger regime to business transactions.
In light of the new leader’s announcement in March 2013 to streamline China’s government
structure, this paper revisits one of the issues raised in the first group of literature and
specifically examines whether the AML should be enforced administratively through one
institution, instead of the current three.11 Now, with almost five years’ of administrative
enforcement history and effects on the legal and business community available for analysis, this
paper identifies three inefficiencies of the two-tier tripartite enforcement structure and
recommends that, not only should there be a single administrative enforcement institution so that
these inefficiencies are reduced, but that this institution should be the AMC. This article then
outlines steps for a possible institutional reform, supported by examples from previous reforms
in China’s government structure. Therefore, this paper contributes to the existing literature by
highlighting why, five years after it came into effect, the AML should now be enforced through
the AMC, and how this result could be achieved.
After reviewing the development of competition law in China (Part II(a)), this paper
describes the AML and criticisms of the law’s enforcement structure (Part II(b)), then reviews
the functions of the AMEAs antitrust departments (Part (c)). Then, this article identifies three
inefficiencies that result from this structure and how they are perceived by the legal community
(Part III). The following section puts forward a two-step institutional reform plan, the benefits of

11

Tania Branigan, China's new premier, Li Keqiang, vows to tackle bureaucracy and corruption, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 17, 2013, 6:24 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/17/china-premier-li-keqiang-bureaucracy,
(“China's new premier has promised to tackle bureaucracy, government excess and corruption as he began his
term.”); See also China scraps railways ministry in streamlining drive, BBC NEWS CHINA (Mar. 10, 2003, 4:47
EDT), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-21732566, (Reporting that in March 2013 the following
ministries were being restructured to boost government efficiency: the railways ministry was dissolved and would
come under the transport ministry; the family planning commission would join the health ministry; the food and
drug administration would become a fully-fledged ministry; and a number of maritime agencies would be pulled
into a single administration.).
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this plan, and likely obstacles that would accompany proposing this reform (Part IV). Lastly,
this paper concludes by reminding the reader the context in which these structural
recommendations are made, and that these suggestions do not address all of the challenges still
facing antitrust enforcement in China.
It should be noted that this paper does not provide or analyze in specific detail private AML
enforcement, nor the interaction between administrative monopolies or state-owned enterprises
and the AML. Although important aspects of AML, these three subjects are outside the scope of
this paper.12
II.

Development of antitrust law and its current enforcement structure in China

This section first reviews how China’s economic policies since 1949 have led to the adoption
of the AML in 2007 by grouping China’s competition law evolution into three stages.13 Then,
this section reviews the provisions of the AML and its administrative enforcement structure. It is
helpful to understand how competition law was enforced prior to the AML because it sheds light
on why the current administrative antitrust enforcement mechanism, although seemingly
saturated with institutions, was adopted by the State Council.14
a. Three periods of competition law development: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1992-2008

12

See generally Changqi Wu & Zhicheng Liu, A Tiger Without Teeth? Regulation of Administrative Monopoly
Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 41 Review of Industrial Organization 133-155 (2012) (for a review of the AML
and administrative monopolies); Joel R. Samuels, “Tain’t What you Do”: Effect of China’s Proposed AntiMonopoly Law on State Owned Enterprises, 26 Penn. St. Int’l L. Rev. 169-202 (For a review of the relationship
between an anti-monopoly law and China’s state-owned enterprises); Zhang, supra note 8 (For a brief review of
China’s judicial enforcement of the AML.).
13
Ming, supra note 2, at 4; See also Susan Ning, Hazel Yin & Yunlong Zhang, The Antimonopoly Law of China:
What have we seen in 2012?, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0a32d1c749c3-46f9-a04e-211416fd67ef.
14
Zhang, supra note 8, at 633.
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From 1949 to 1978 China’s economic policy consisted of maintaining its centrally-planned
economy.15 During this period the domestic economy was organized through national planning,
and therefore there was no competition in the economy.16 China shifted away from this policy to
a planned market economy in 1978 when it adopted the Reform and Opening-Up Policy
(ROUP).17 Under this second phase China “embarked on a policy of ‘opening’ to foreign
influence” that was strictly limited to the economic realm.18 As such limited competition took
place, and legislation related to competition in the market place was “isolated and rare.”19 In
1992 the Chinese Communist Party announced its goal to establish a socialist market economy.20
It is during this third period that one observes a handful of competition-related regulations and
legislation (at least nine texts were promulgated) enacted domestically, and enforced by mostly
three institutions, the MOFCOM, the NDRC, and the SAIC.21 For example, the Anti-unfair
competition law (“the AUCL”) was adopted in 1993, and prohibits tying, price fixing, and bid
rigging, but does not address other anticompetitive behavior, such as the formation of
monopolies.22 The AUCL is currently enforced by the SAIC.23 Following the AUCL, the Price
Law was adopted in 1998, and prohibits particular types of pricing conduct, such as predatory

15

Jessica Su & Xiaoye Wang, China: The Competition Law System and the Country’s Norms, in THE DESIGN OF
COMPETITION LAW AND INSTITUTIONS, 194, 194 (Eleanor M. Fox and Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013).
16
Ming , supra note 2, at 4.
17
Id.
18
MARK WILLIAMS, COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN CHINA, HONG KONG, AND TAIWAN 111 (2005).
19
Ming, supra note 2, at 4 (Discussing two such texts were the Provisional Regulation on the Development and
Protection of Socialist Competition enacted in 1980, and the Regulation on the Administration of Advertisement of
the People’s Republic of China enacted in 1987. The former was the first rule to curb monopolies, and
administrative monopolies in particular, by development and protecting socialist competition. The latter regulation
was related to advertising activities, and stated that ‘monopolies and unfair competition in advertising activities are
prohibited.”).
20
Id.; See also WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 95 (The term ‘socialist market economy’ is used in Article 15 of the
People’s Republic of China, but it is not defined or explained.).
21
Susan Beth Farmer, The Evolution of Chinese Merger Notification Guidelines: A Work in Progress Integrating
Global Consensus and Domestic Imperatives, 18 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 7 (2009-2010).
22
Thomas Brook, China’s Anti-monopoly Law: History, Application, and Enforcement, 16 Appeal: Rev. Current L.
& L. Reform 31, 33 (2011).
23
Su et al., supra note 15, at 199.
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pricing and price discrimination.24 It is currently enforced by the NDRC.25 Before the AML was
enacted, the MOFCOM reviewed mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises by foreign
investors, pursuant to the Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by
Foreign Investors 2006 (“Provisions 2006”). These provisions included four articles relating to
antitrust review of pending mergers.26 Since the AML was enacted, the 2006 Provisions have
been amended to conform with the merger notification requirements set forth in the AML.27 In
addition to these two competition laws, China also has a Contract Law, adopted in 1999, and a
Bidding Law, promulgated in 2000.28
While these laws that focused on particular economic behavior were enacted, an antitrust law
was already included on the legislative agendas of the 8th, 9th, and 10th National People’s
Congress (NPC).29 A working group established by the State Council in 1994 began the
legislative process for an antitrust law, but it was only in 2006 that a draft of the current AML
was submitted to the Standing Committee of the NPC.30 The AML was promulgated by the
Standing Committee on August 30, 2007.31 It became effective on August 1, 2008.32 Scholars
suggest that the law’s drafting period lasted almost thirteen years for several reasons: the law
was controversial given China’s economic history and political structure, it was difficult to create
a space for a comprehensive competition law in an economy where regulating anticompetitive
24

Ming, supra note 2, at 5.
H. STEPHEN HARRIS, JR., PETER J. WANG, MARK A. COHEN, YIZHE ZHANG & SEBASTIEN J. EVRARD, ANTIMONOPOLY LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 351 (2011).
26
Su et al., supra note 15, at 195-196.; See also Brook, supra note 22, at 34.
27
Yee Wah Chin, M&A Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Bus. L. Today, A.B.A. Business Law Section 1, 2-3
(Sept. 2010), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/articles/2010/09/0002.pdf.
28
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 361.
29
Su et al., supra note 15, at 197.
30
Xian-Chu, supra note 1, at 1470; See also Farmer, supra note 21, at 6 (Stating that the MOFCOM was the
principle drafter of the AML), and Brook, supra note 22, at 34 (Describing that international anti-trust experts
provided comments to the AML during the drafting phase of the law, and today comments from the United States
and European anti-trust enforcement agencies are viewed as having shaped the current AML.), and Su et al., supra
note 15, at 197.
31
Ming, supra note 2, at 4.
32
Farmer, supra note 21, at 6.
25
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behavior had only just began, an antimonopoly law would question the role of local
protectionism and administrative monopolies in China’s particular market economy, and
throughout the drafting period the MOFCOM, the NDRC, and the SAIC vied for exclusive
jurisdiction to enforce the new anti-monopoly law.33
b. Overview of the AML
Despite its name, the AML does not cover solely monopolies and monopolistic conduct. The
competition laws in existence prior to the AML were narrow and specific, and the goal of the
AML was to establish a “coherent competition policy” in China.34 Thus, the law targets three
types of monopolistic conduct, similar to antitrust laws in other countries: monopolistic
agreements, abuse of dominant market position, and mergers and acquisitions.35
The law has eight chapters and 57 articles.36 The first section describes the laws general
provisions, such as scope and definitions of relevant terms.37 Chapter Two describes the types of
prohibited monopoly agreements under the law and any exceptions, while Chapter Three reviews
the definition of market dominance abuse and its prohibited conduct.38 Chapter Four examines
notification procedures for mergers and acquisitions, and administrative monopolies are the
subject of Chapter Five.39 Approved investigation procedures are contained in Chapter Six,
penalties are covered in Chapter Seven, and lastly Chapter Eight excludes the “lawful exercise”

33

Xian-Chu supra note 1, at 1470; See also Wang Xiaoye, The Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of
China, 3 China Legal Dev. Y.B. 105, 106 (2009), and Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun, & Wentong Zheng, China’s
Competition Policy Reforms: the Anti-Monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 Antitrust L.J. 231, 232 (2008-2009), and Salil
K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust Functionalism: Reconsidering China’s Antimonopoly Law, 49 Va. J.
Int’l L.380, 396 (2008-2009).
34
Xian-Chu, supra note 1, at 1472.
35
Bush, supra note 7, at 46-50.
36
The People’s Republic of China Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), translated in CHINA LAW & PRACTICE (Oct. 1, 2007).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
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of intellectual property rights and monopolies within the agricultural sector from prosecution
under the AML.40
China’s two other important competition laws, the AUCL and the Price Law, are still
effective and are enforced in parallel with the AML.41 However, the AML differs from these
laws in terms of the context in which it is applied, and the leniency provisions it makes available
to implicated parties. For example, the AUCL is very specific in that it only prohibits the “abuse
of power of public enterprises,” and penalties for violating this law were minimal.42 Similarly,
the Price Law “emphasizes more the examination of whether the conduct itself stays in
compliance with provisions of the law” and does not require that the implicated party have a
dominant market position.43 The AML, on the other hand, “emphasizes the examination of the
impact of such conduct on competition in the market,” and the party involved must have a
dominant market position.44 The AML also has a broader objective than these two other laws: it
seeks to prevent and restrain monopolies, protect fair competition in the market, enhance
economic efficiency, safeguard the interests of consumers, and promote the healthy development
of the socialist market economy.45
c. Administrative enforcement of the AML

40

Id.; Brook, supra note 22, at 35.
Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 7.
42
Xiaoye, supra note 33, at 105.
43
Fei Deng, H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Yizhe Zhang, Interview with Xu Kunlin, Director General of the Department
of Price Supervision Under the National Development and Reform Commission of People’s Republic of China, THE
ANTITRUST SOURCE (Feb. 2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/antitrust_law/feb11_fullsource.authcheckdam.pd
f, 1, 4 (The SAIC and the NDRC have “stepped up communications and cooperation” since the AML was enacted.)
44
Fei Deng, H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Yizhe Zhang, Interview with Ning Wanglu, Director General of the AntiMonopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau Under the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (Feb. 2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/antitrust_law/feb11_fullsource.authcheckdam.pd
f, 1, 4 (The SAIC has “experimented with NDRC in setting up a case coordination mechanism.”).
45
Xiaoye, supra note 33, at 106. See also HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25 (for additional information on the
substantive provisions of the AML.).
41
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This subsection describes the AML’s current administrative enforcement and scholars’
comments on this enforcement. As described previously, the competition laws existing before
2007 were scattered among various laws and regulations that were enforced by three separate
ministries.46 This division of enforcement among multiple ministries is reflected in the current
administrative enforcement of the AML, and allowed pursuant to Articles 9 and 10 of the law:
“The State Council will set up the Anti-Monopoly Commission
(“AMC”), which is responsible for organizing, coordinating and
supervising anti-monopoly-related activities, and performs the
following functions: (1) researching and formulating competition
policies; (2) organizing investigation and evaluation of the overall
market competition condition and publishing evaluation reports;
(3) formulating and publishing anti-monopoly guidelines; (4)
coordinating administrative enforcement of the AML; and (5) other
functions specified by the State Council. The organization and
working rules of the AMC shall be formulated by the State
Council.47 The Anti-monopoly Enforcement Authority designated
by the State Council to undertake the responsibilities of the AML
enforcement (hereinafter referred to as Anti-monopoly
Enforcement Authority under the State Council, “AMEA”) is
responsible for the enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law. The
AMEA, if necessary, may authorize corresponding organs of the
People’s Governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and
provincial level municipalities to be responsible for relevant antimonopoly enforcement activities in accordance with this Law.”48

These two articles illustrate that the AML is administratively enforced through two levels of
governance: the AMC and the AMEA.49 The entity designated to be the AMEA is left to the
discretion of the State Council, and the law leaves open the State Council’s possibility to name
multiple agencies as the AMEA.

46

Ming, supra note 2, at 5.
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 377; See also PRC Anti-monopoly law, supra note 36, art 9.
48
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 378; See also PRC Anti-monopoly law, supra note 36, art. 10.
49
Zhang, supra note 8, at 633.
47
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It was uncertain whether the State Council would designate a single agency or multiple
government agencies as the AMEA when the AML was passed in 2007.50 However, there was
speculation that the AMEA would be composed of the three agencies enforcing competition laws
at the time, the MOFCOM, the NDRC, and the SAIC.51 Once the State Council and its
ministries underwent structural reform in March 2008, it became clear that these three ministries
would be involved in the AML’s enforcement because the structural reform included the creation
of antitrust offices (“the AMEAs”) within all three ministries.52
The literature on the AML’s drafting and enactment period states that while the law was in its
drafting stage, the State Council could not choose one existing ministry to enforce the AML
because the MOFCOM, the NDRC and the SAIC refused to cede their jurisdiction over
competition matters to an existing or new entity.53 However, both the MOFCOM and the SAIC
agreed that an antitrust body should be formed under the State Council, with each ministry
retaining enforcement authority.54 Therefore, although the existing two-tier, tripartite
enforcement structure is institution heavy, there is method to this madness: given the channels
used to enforce competition laws in China prior to 2007, the AML’s enforcement structure is a
compromise between the ministries involved with enforcing competition law prior to the AML
maintaining their enforcement abilities, and the need for a separate body responsible for

50

Jones Day Commentary, New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, 1,5 ( Oct. 2007),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/eb6dcb2a-624d-4242-b791cc8faa3a1e52/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4836e746-cc52-49cd-b96cd764ae9bea1a/New%20Chinese%20Anti-Monopoly.pdf.
51
Id.; See also Farmer, supra note 21, at 7.
52
Jones Day Commentary, Structure and Responsibilities of Enforcement Agencies Under China Anti-Monopoly
Law Clarified (Jul. 2008), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/d74085e3-0c9e-4c6c-888630ce91b29caa/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/63d181b9-bbc1-45cf-886bf6e250060937/China%20AML%20Clarified.pdf; See also Jones Day Commentary, The China Anti-Monopoly Law
Becomes Effective 1,8 (Aug. 2008), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/aba8c9e2-bea8-4f33-8a6f38b5c6ab7848/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3059dfbd-15a1-4804-a409-0074ded6dc4c/China%20AntiMonopoly.pdf.
53
Zhang, supra note 8, at 635.
54
Xian-Chu, supra note 1, at 1478.
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“pushing forward China’s competition policies,” since few existed, and coordinating
enforcement among the AMEAs.55 An additional attractive feature of this structure is that it
most likely assured faster approval of the AML because enforcement of the law could be
delegated to existing institutions.56 Enforcing antitrust law through more than one entity is not
uncommon. In the United States for example, the federal antitrust laws are enforced by the
United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission.57
That being said, China’s AML administrative enforcement structure is not without its
disadvantages. These are also reflected in the literature on the AML’s structure.58 With respect
to the AMEAs, these criticisms highlight that this structure does not provide for an independent
AMEA that is not “subjugated to an existing ministry,” which the AMEA would require in order
to carry out its statutory functions.59 Also, by placing the AMEA under an existing ministry, it
would have to compete for resources, thus perhaps limiting its performance.60 Lastly, given that
the AMEAs are placed within existing ministries, they are relatively low in China’s bureaucratic
hierarchy, thus reducing their power with respect to investigating state-owned enterprises and
administrative monopolies, other ministries, and other government offices.61 Lastly, regarding
the AMC, one criticism is that it also lacks “independence and impartiality” because of its
composition and its requirement to report to the State Council, both of which indicate that the

55

Xiaoye, supra note 33, at 108; See also HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 264, and Xian-Chu, supra note 1, at
1478, and Owen et al., supra note 33, at 260-261.
56
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 265; See also Owen et al., supra note 33, at 261.
57
Farmer, supra note 21, at 8.
58
Owen et al., supra note 33, at 260-265; See also Xian-Chu, supra note 1, at 1476-1479.
59
Owen et al., supra note 33, at 261.
60
Id.
61
Jones Day Commentary, The China Anti-Monopoly Law Becomes Effective, supra note 53, at 9 (Stating that “the
relatively low hierarchy of these authorities in the Chinese bureaucratic system may render enforcement actions
against large state-owned enterprises or local governmental “administrative monopolies” more difficult and may
render competition decisions more susceptible to the influence of factors unrelated to competition issues.”); See also
Confusion lingers of China Anti-Monopoly law, ASIALAW (Sept. 2008),
http://www.asialaw.com/Article/2005006/Confusion-lingers-over-China-Anti-MonopolyLaw.html?Print=true&Single=true.
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AMC is “subject to the administrative personnel and budgetary control of the Central
Government.”62 Nevertheless, this is the AML’s current enforcement structure. As discussed
below, the AMC has the role of an oversight body and the AMEAs are responsible for enforcing
the law.63
i.

The AMC

The AMC is a policy body organized under the State council.64 It was established in August
2008 pursuant to Article 9 of the AML.65 It was specifically created to assist in the public
enforcement of the AML.66 Essentially, it is a “coordinating body under the State Council”
responsible for “drafting competition related policies, organizing investigations, assessing the
overall market competition, publishing assessment reports and anti-monopoly guidelines, and
coordinating anti-monopoly law enforcement.”67 The importance of the AMC is its role in
promoting market competition since China had a very small competition culture prior to the
AML.68 Additionally, the AMC is supposed to coordinate enforcement of the AML among the
AMEAs.69 Therefore, the AMC does not enforce any part of the law, but assists in its
application by providing, for example, definitions of terms applicable to any enforcement under
the law.70 The AMC reports directly to the State Council.71
62

Xian-Chu, supra note 1, at 1479.
Id.
64
Jun Wei, Kevin Bai & Keddy Huang, NDRC maps out its main responsibilities, internal organizations, and
personnel, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f5bf8d01-4dcb-8334ca41316980ad.
65
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 266.
66
The China Anti-Monopoly Law Becomes Effective, supra note 48, at 1; See also Michael Gu, An Introduction of
the Anti-Monopoly Law in China, CHINA LAW VISION (Oct. 23, 2012),
http://www.chinalawvision.com/2012/10/articles/competitionantitrust-law-of-th/an-introduction-of-theantimonopoly-law-in-china/.
67
Gu, supra note 66.
68
Xiaoye, supra note 33, at 108.
69
Id.
70
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 266; See also Cleary Gottlieb Alert Memo, China’s Antimonopoly
Commission of the State Council Issues Final Guidelines for the Definition of Relevant Market, (Jul. 24, 2009),
63
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The AMC contains officials from the NDRC, the SAIC, and the MOFCOM, in addition to
representatives from other ministries that are responsible for “commerce or industrial policy.”72
It is important to note that it was only in June 2011 that the State Council approved the formal
establishment of an AMC office.73 Prior to this it seems that the AMC’s responsibilities were
assumed by the MOFCOM’s office responsible for antitrust enforcement, the Anti-Monopoly
Bureau (MOFCOM-AMB).74 Now that the State Council has approved its formal establishment,
the AMC appears to be a body recognized outside of the MOFCOM-AMB, indicated by the
creation of an AMC office in September 2011.75 This office handles the day-to-day tasks that
were previously performed by the MOFCOM-AMB.76 As developed in Part IV, it is the author’s
opinion that this establishment could be interpreted as a signal that the AMC will be assigned

http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/7d9d0894-47fb-468d-a24da1c24063521e/Presentation/NewsAttachment/eacf6ebf-a284-4882-a8cb-a70111c0ca11/CGSH%20Alert%20%20MOFCOM%20guidelines%20on%20market%20definition.pdf, 1, 1 (Stating that in July 2009 the AMC issued
guidelines on how the term ‘relevant markets’ should be defined in antitrust analysis), and John V. Grobowski &
Yiqiang Li, Guidelines on the Definition of Relevant Market, Faegre Baker Daniels Updates & Events (Sept. 1,
2009), http://www.faegrebd.com/10165 (The guidelines define a ‘relevant market’ as a product, or group of
products, that the consumer can easily substitute for one another. The guidelines further define the terms ‘relevant
geographic market’ and ‘relevant product market.’ Almost all antitrust violation investigations will likely require a
determination of the relevant market at issue.).
71
Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 8.
72
Brook, supra note 22note 22, at 40; See also Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 9, and
Susan Ning & Yin Ranran, Formal Establishment of Ant-Monopoly Commission Office within MOFCOM Approved,
CHINA LAW INSIGHT (June 17, 2011), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2011/06/articles/corporate/antitrustcompetition/formal-establishment-of-antimonopoly-commission-office-within-mofcom-approved/ (The following
officials that served on the AMC in 2011 included the following: (1) Director: Vice-Premier of the State Council;
(2) Vice-Directors: a. Minister of MOFCOM; b. Director of the NDRC; c. Director of the SAIC; d. Vice-SecretaryGeneral of the State Council. (3) Commissioners: a. Vice-Minister of MOFCOM; b. Vice-Director of the NDRC; c.
Vice-Director of SAIC; d. Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; e. Vice-Minister
of the Ministry of Supervision; f. Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Finance; g. Vice-Minister of the Ministry of
Transport; h. Deputy Director-General of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission; i.
Vice-Director of the State Intellectual Property Office; j. Vice-Director of the Legislative Affairs Office of the State
Council; k. Vice-President of the China Banking Regulatory Commission; l. Vice-President of the China Securities
Regulatory Commission; m. Vice-President of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission; n. Vice-President of
the State Electricity Regulatory Commission.).
73
Ning et al., supra note 72.
74
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 267.
75
Gu, supra note 66.
76
Id.
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additional responsibilities regarding the AML, perhaps elevating its role in the development of
the law.
ii.

The MOFCOM

The MOFCOM is a “ministry-level agency.”77 It is mainly responsible for negotiating
China’s trade agreements, and regulating trade and investment, both domestic and foreign.78
Pursuant to the 2006 Provisions, one of this ministry’s responsibilities was to review proposed
mergers, acquisitions, and other business dealings for their possible antitrust effects.79 The
MOFCOM-AMB was formed within MOFCOM in August 2008, and is the bureau through
which MOFCOM enforces the AML’s merger control regime.80 Therefore given the ministry’s
responsibility before the AML was enacted, the MOFCOM-AMB has jurisdiction to review
antitrust matters related to mergers, acquisitions, and other business transactions.81 This office
also guides Chinese enterprises in defending antitrust suits overseas and coordinates bilateral and
multilateral cooperation on competition policy issues.82 The office is comprised of six
divisions.83 The AMB has the bureaucratic level of General Directorate.84
This bureau enforces the merger control regime of the AML by requiring that it be notified of
mergers, acquisitions, and similar business dealings that meet a specified turnover threshold, so

77

HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 270.
Su et al., supra note 15, at 199.
79
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 268.
80
Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 8.
81
Jun Wei, Sherry Y. Gong & Kevin Bai, Head of China’s Anti-monopoly Bureau further explains antitrust matters,
LEXOLOGY (Dec. 11, 2008), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ab3be5f4-cd5c-4e87-b3ad6788d924a2a4.
82
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 271.
83
Su et al., supra note 15, at 204 (The divisions include the General Office, the Competition Policy Division, the
Consultation Division, the Legal Division, the Economics Division, and the Supervision and Enforcement
Division.).
84
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 271.
78
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that it can review and clear them, before these dealings occur.85 The MOFCOM-AMB is only
required to publish its AML decisions in two situations: if it blocks or if it imposes conditions
on the business transaction in question.86 However in an effort to increase transparency, in
January 2013 the MOFCOM-AMB released all of its decisions, including those where the
business dealing was cleared unconditionally.87
The MOFCOM-AMB has been extremely active in its enforcement of the AML over the last
five years, and has reviewed more than 500 cases.88 Additionally, it has issued at least 13
implementing regulations and guidelines concerning enforcement of the AML.89 However, it
was publicly acknowledged that many deals still are not notified to the MOFOM-AMB.90
Unlike the SAIC’s and the NDRC’s antitrust bureaus, the MOFCOM-AMB has not delegated its
enforcement responsibilities to its local or provincial counterparts.91
iii.

The NDRC

The NDRC is also a “ministerial-level entity” under the State Council that is responsible for
preparing policies concerning China’s national economic development.92 As such, it assists in

85

Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 28, 31 (In practice, the AML’s rules sometimes require that the MOFCOMAMB be notified of transactions that “bear little or no connection” with China.).
86
Philip F. Monaghan, China: Antimonopoly Law, GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, THE ASIA-PACIFIC ANTITRUST
REVIEW 2013 SECTION 2: COUNTRY CHAPTERS,
www.globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/51/sections/175/chapters/1969/china-antimonopoly-law/.
87
Susan Ning, Kailun Ji & Kate Peng, Chinese antitrust regulators provided updates on their enforcement activities
(Jan. 28, 2013) http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2013/01/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/a-considerablestep-of-chinese-antitrust-regulators-in-the-road-heading-for-transparency/, (stating that in 2012, MOFCOM had
accepted 186 cases, 154 of which had been cleared unconditionally, and 6 cleared with conditions).
88
Jones Day Commentary, Lessons from Four Years of Antitrust Enforcement in China 1, 2 (Sept. 2012),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/6079ef96-f8e2-40c0-acca20b395741423/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/080caf11-2f8e-4cbe-96812248d8491fef/Lessons%20from%20Four%20Years%20of%20Antitrust.pdf.
89
Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 42-44.
90
More Muscle, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE (Feb. 2012),
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.shu.edu/docview/993531218/13C6FB4CC8833534AC/95?accountid=13793.
91
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 272.
92
Id. at 277.
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managing China’s transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy.93 The
NDRC unit responsible for enforcing the AML is the Department of Price Supervision (NDRCDPS), which has nine divisions.94 Given that the NDRC has jurisdiction to enforce the Price
Law, its investigatory powers and enforcement under the AML are limited to suspicious pricerelated conduct of monopoly agreements and abuse of dominant market positions. 95 This
department conducts its AML enforcement by carrying out investigations of suspected prohibited
conduct that are relayed to the office following a “complaint, case transfer from another
authority, or by acting on its own initiative.”96 Pursuant to Article 10 of the law, the NDRC-DPS
has delegated its enforcement powers to its provincial bureaus.97 It may, but is not required to,
publish its decisions.98
When compared to the MOFCOM-AMB, the NDRC-DPS appeared relatively quiet the first
two years following the AML’s adoption.99 It has been suggested that this could stem from three
possible reasons: its ministry was under-resourced and thus could not investigate antitrust
matters, it was in the process of drafting its own regulations and guidelines in order to enforce
the law, or its lack of involvement was illusory because it is not required to publish its
decisions.100 Since 2008, the NDRC-DPS has issued only four texts providing further
regulations and guidelines on its antitrust enforcement.101 However, since it issued regulations in
2011, it does not seem to have shied away from applying the AML to anticompetitive

93

Id. at 277.
Id. at 278; See also Su et al., supra note 15, at 203 (These divisions include the Price Monopoly Division I, the
Price Monopoly Division II, and the Competition Policy and International Cooperation Division.).
95
Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 21.
96
Id. at 8.
97
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25., SUPRA NOTE 25, at 279.
98
Norton Rose Guide, supra note 7, at 22; HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 278.
99
Anti-monopoly: Agencies walk a fine line, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE (Jan. 2010),
http://search.proquest.comezproxy.shu.edu/docview/224792924/13C6F89F27A154A1481/77?accountid=13793.
100
Id.
101
Norton Rose Guide, supra note 7, at 42-44.
94
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behavior.102 In January 2013 this department announced in its first disclosure to the public of its
AML caseload that it had investigated 49 price-related cases, two of which resulted in penalties,
since the AML went into effect.103
iv.

The SAIC

The SAIC is also a “ministerial-level entity” under the State Council.104 The office
responsible for enforcing the AML is the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition
Enforcement Bureau (SAIC-AMAUCEB), which has five divisions.105 Similar to the NDRCDPS, it has delegated AML enforcement authority to its provincial, sub-provincial, and local
bureaus.106 Since the SAIC currently enforces the AUCL, the State Council gave the SAIC’s
AMEA jurisdiction under the AML to enforce all non-price related antitrust matters concerning
monopoly agreements and abuse of dominant market positions.107 The SAIC-AMAUCEB’s
enforcement of the law follows the same channels as that of the NDRC-DPS, therefore the
former also conducts its enforcement by carrying out investigations of suspected prohibited
conduct that are relayed to the office following a “complaint, case transfer from another
authority, or by acting on its own initiative.”108 Also similar to the NDRC-DPS, the SAICAMAUCEB was not as active the first two years following the AML’s enactment. It seems to

102

Id. at 17 (In 2011 the NDRC announced its imposition of a RMB 7 million fine on two pharmaceutical
companies engaged in exclusive supply agreements, a violation of article 17(4) of the AML.), See also China:
Record fines imposed in Chinese Maotai Liquor RPM Cases, MONDAQ (Mar. 12, 2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/226126/Antitrust+Competition/Record+Fines+Imposed+In+Chinese+Maotai+Liquor+R
PM+Cases (Reporting the NDRC had imposed record fines under the AML of RMB 449 million against two liquor
companies for resale price maintenance practices.).
103
Ning et al., supra note 87.
104
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 273.
105
Id. at 275; Su et al., supra note 15, at 203 (These divisions are the Comprehensive Division, the Anti-Monopoly
Enforcement Division, the Anti-Monopoly Legislative Affairs Division, the Anti-Unfair Competition Division, and
the Case Supervision and Coordination Division.).
106
Norton Rose Guide, supra note 7, at 9.
107
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 274.
108
Norton Rose Guide, supra note 9, at 21.
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have been more active since it issued its own implementing regulations and guidelines in January
2011.109 In an announcement in December 2012 by the Director General of the SAICAMAUCEB, it appeared that the bureau was increasing its AML caseload.110
III.

Inefficiencies stemming from the Two-tier, Tripartite Administrative
Enforcement Structure

The AML’s administrative enforcement system has been in force for almost five years.
Although doubts arose with respect to the effectiveness of this structure, firms practicing
antitrust law in China that have issued commentaries on the development and application of the
AML are generally positive regarding the law’s administrative enforcement.111 True, enforcing
the law through this system does deliver results, as indicated by the AMEAs enforcement
actions, but this structure creates certain inefficiencies. Some of these inefficiencies impact the
AMEAs ability to process cases, while other inefficiencies lead to confusion about the AML in
the legal community, raising questions about the AMC’s coordination role in the AML. The
following section highlights three such structural inefficiencies, unapparent coordination among
the AMEAs, under-resourced ministries, and the concurrent enforcement of pre-AML

109

Anti-monopoly: Agencies walk a fine line, supra note 99; See also Susan Ning, Liu Jia & Kate Peng, A General
Picture of SAIC’s Antitrust Enforcement, CHINA LAW INSIGHT,
http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/07/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/a-general-picture-of-saicsantitrust-enforcement/ (According to a statement by the Director-General of the SAIC in July 2012, the SAIC and its
regional bureaus have launched investigations in a total of 14 antitrust cases, one of which resulted in imposing a
fine of RMB 200,000 against the Concrete Committee of the Construction Materials and Construction Machinery
Industry Association of Lianyungang City.).
110
Ning, supra note 109.
111
Jones Day Commentary, supra note 88, at 1 (Jones Day noted that “China has made considerable progress in
only a few short years.”); See also China’s anti-monopoly regime dissected, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE (Dec.
2012/Jan.2013),
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.shu.edu/docview/1237147335/13C6F860FE04CEF5789/5?accountid=13793
(Citing McDermott Will & Emery lawyer that said China’s enforcement authorities should be “praised for doing a
reasonably good job so far, although transparency is clearly lacking.”).
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competition laws.112 It should be noted that because of the AMEAs disclosure requirements,
there is a limited sample of information available for review with respect to why the AMEAs
have rendered certain antitrust decisions.
a. Unapparent coordination among the AMEAs
Article 9 of the AML includes “coordinating anti-monopoly administrative law enforcement
work” as one of the AMC’s responsibilities.113 Although this does not specifically call for a
uniform application of the law by all three AMEAs, it is this author’s opinion that a reasonable
person would expect the law to be applied consistently among the AMEAs, or at least not result
in conflicting applications by the AMEAs. Representatives of the AMEAs’ antitrust bureaus
indicate that their AML departments do coordinate their enforcement activities, and will continue
to do so in the future.114 However, as described below, this expectation does not seem to have
materialized with respect to certain matters.
i.

Different transparency requirements

As stated previously, although the AMEAs appear to be disclosing more information
regarding their AML decisions, required disclosure practices differ from AMEA to AMEA. The
MOFCOM-AMB, for example, is only required to publish its decision if it blocks a merger of
imposes conditions on the merger, while the NDRC-DPS and the SAIC-AMAUCEB are not
required to publish any of their AML decisions. If the AMEAs were to stop their current trend
of disclosing their decisions, then the only disclosed decisions would be those pertaining to the
AML’s merger control regime because only the MOFCOM-AMB is required to publish its
112

This is not an exhaustive list of the mechanism’s inefficiencies. These are the inefficiencies this author
discovered while reading journal articles and reports on the AML’s administrative enforcement structure.
113
PRC Anti-monopoly law, supra note 38, art. 9(1).
114
Deng et al., supra note 44.
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decision under certain circumstances. Therefore, one result of dividing enforcement among three
agencies that do not have the same transparency requirements may be that the public only learns
how the AML is applied to one third of the conduct it prohibits.
This issue raises the question of the AMC’s role in the coordinating enforcement activities
among the AMEAs. Why are not all the AMEAs required to publish their decisions? More
importantly, if the AMC is supposed to develop a competition mentality, requiring that these
decisions be published would be in its best interest because these would provide the public with
actual examples of both permitted and prohibited anticompetitive conduct. In turn, failing to
publish these decisions may harm those parties that need to learn from the law’s application the
most: businesses, which need to understand why certain conduct is sanctioned so as to engage in
legal competitive behavior, and lawyers, who need to advise their clients on business practices in
China.
ii.

Overlapping jurisdiction among the AMEAs

The MOFCOM-AMB’s jurisdiction under the AML is well defined: it has jurisdiction to
review the concentration of mergers and acquisitions.115 However, despite provisions and
procedural rules by the NDRC-DPS and the SAIC-AMAUCEB, the jurisdictional dividing line
between the other two AMEAs matters remains unclear.116 This is because an antitrust issue can
involve both price and non-price related matters.117 In this scenario, which AMEA would
undertake investigating the anti-monopoly issue? Would the two agencies split the investigation
among them, or would one agency take on the entire matter, and if the latter, how would this be
decided? More importantly, how will injured parties know with which ministry to file a
115

Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 28.
Zhang, supra note 8, at 641.
117
Id. (stating that a firm may have abused its dominant market position by tying and selling at an unfairly high
price, triggering the jurisdiction of both agencies).
116
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complaint if the issue at hand straddles both jurisdictions? Again, the AMC, which is expected
to coordinate enforcement among the AMEAs, does not appear to have weighed in on this matter
as articles and reports on this issue do not discuss the AMC’s involvement in resolving this issue.
Determining the answer to this question is not facilitated by the fact that these two AMEAs are
not required to publish their decisions, which might provide some guidance if made available.
The impact on the legal community of failing to clearly define which competition activities
are included under these two AMEAs, and whether there is in fact coordination among these
ministries, became apparent in 2010, when a tying practice by a salt company was exposed. The
NDRC-DPS investigated and made a decision on a tying practice by the Wuchang Salt Company
in Hubei in November 2010.118 However, because tying does not readily appear to be related to
pricing, since the seller is not using price but its dominant position in the market to entice
consumers to purchase its product and a secondary product, one would have expected the SAICAMAUCEB to take on the investigation.119 When the NDRC-DPS announced that it was
imposing fines on the Wuchang Salt Company, the legal community’s reaction indicated surprise
that the NDRC-DPS even had jurisdiction over the matter.120

118

Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 8; See generally Ernset Gellhorn & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and
Economics in a nutshell, 326 (West Publishing Co. 4th ed. 1994) (Describing a tying arrangement as one that occurs
where the seller of a product conditions the sale of one product on the buyer’s agreement to purchase a second
product. Therefore the buyer can only purchase the tying product if he agrees to also purchase the tied product. The
seller typically has market dominance in the tying product market, and is encouraging the sale of its products in the
tied-product market.).
119
Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 8.
120
Zhang, supra note 8, at 643 (Highlighting that the prohibited conduct was non-price related and therefore the
NDRC-DPS did not have jurisdiction over the anticompetitive conduct, thus “raising doubts as to whether NDRC
and SAIC will strictly adhere to their division of labor.”); See also Susan Ning, Zheng Ziqing & Angie Ng, What
Constitutes Anticompetitive Tying in China? The Wuchang Salt Company Case, ChinaLawInsight (Nov. 30, 2010),
http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2010/11/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/what-constitutes-anticompetitivetying-in-china-the-wuchang-salt-company-case/.
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The public’s confusion regarding jurisdiction of the AMEAs arose again in 2009 when BHP
Billiton and Rio Tinto announced a proposed joint venture.121 The legal community believed
that the joint venture would have to be reviewed by at least one of the AMEAs.122 All three of
the authorities wanted jurisdiction over the investigation because the AML was “proving to be
one of China’s most high-profile pieces of legislation.”123 However, there appeared to be a split
among lawyers as to which AMEA would have jurisdiction over the review: one layer believed
that the MOFCOM-AMB was the regulator that would investigate the deal, while a second
lawyer believed that the other two AMEAs would be involved so as to “be seen to have had a say
in this case.”124 The MOFCOM-AMB eventually launched the investigation into the joint
venture.125 However, the initial split in the legal community indicates that division of
monopolistic conduct among these agencies was unclear.
As stated previously, both the NDRC-DPS and the SAIC-AMAUCEB have issued
regulations and guidelines that are supposed to define the dividing line between their authority.
However, given the legal community’s reaction to the above investigations, these guidelines do
121

Anonymous, BHP-Rio could provoke China regulatory tussle, 28 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 8, 8-9 (2008-2010),
http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.shu.edu/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/intfinr28&id=612&siz
e=2&collection=journals&terms=law|financial%20regulatory|review|International|Law|tussle|regulatory|BHP|Financ
ial%20Regulatory|Financial|financial|could|Regulatory|Rio&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=0#612; See also
BHPRio and MOFCOM were in pre-consultation on JV, (Dec. 23, 2009),
http://news.alibaba.com/article/detail/metalworking/100222976-1-bhp-rio-mofcom-were-pre-consultation-jv.html
(The joint venture would actually occur in Australia, but because of the turnover of the parties involved, the business
transaction fell under the AML’s merger review provisions. China was also concerned about the joint venture’s
possible impacts on the iron ore market in China.).
122
BHP-Rio could provoke China regulatory tussle, supra note 121, at 8-9 (“The competition review of the
proposed joint venture between BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto could spark an internal tussle between Chinese
regulators keen to assert their jurisdiction over the AML.”).
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.; See also MOFCOM investigates BHP, Rio Tinto JV plan, CSR-China (2010-05-10), http://www.csrchina.net/templates/node/index.aspx?nodeid=ddd0b45c-b7c4-4947-b2e3e20374708733&page=contentpage&contentid=ce66c993-8116-48be-86ba-b965edc4927c&l=en, and China
Investigates Rio, BHP Iron Ore JV, Business Watch-Morning Whistle (May 5, 9:16 AM),
http://businesswatch.21cbh.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=9&id=175733, and Julia Kollewe,
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto scrap iron-ore venture, The Guardian (Oct. 18, 2010 12:36 EDT),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/oct/18/bhp-billiton-rio-tinto-venture-scrapped (The proposal was canceled
in late 2010.).

22

Fulena, Yasmine
Law 9613 Final Draft 4.26.2013

not seem to sufficiently address this issue. The AMC’s apparent silence on these investigations
also raises questions concerning its role in coordinating enforcement activities among the
AMEAs. Therefore, this undefined jurisdiction, which is a product of the tripartite system,
seems to create confusion in the legal sphere.
iii.

Inconsistent application of the AML’s leniency program

Leniency programs are designed to encourage entities involved in an agreement that violates
antitrust law to disclose this information to the relevant authority, with the hope that the
reporting entity will either not be fined for its conduct, or be imposed a reduced fine.126 Pursuant
to Article 46 of the AML, both the NDRC-DPS and the SAIC-AMAUCEB have leniency
programs that are only applicable to anticompetitive conduct related to monopoly agreements,
and not abuse of dominance.127
Although established through the same article of the AML, there are inconsistencies between
the application of these two programs as highlighted in the procedural regulations of each
ministry.128 First, it appears that the NDRC-DPS has discretion over whether or not to grant
immunity, while the SAIC-AMAUCEB does not have this same discretion, it must grant
leniency.129 Both AMEAs grant complete leniency to the first entity to self-report and provide
“important evidence” about an anticompetitive agreement.130 However, under the NDRC-DPS’s
program, the second entity to self-report can receive “a reduction of at least 50% [of the fine],

126

Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, New Wine into Old Wineskins: Recent Developments in China’s
Competition Policy Against Monopolistic/Collusive Agreements, 41 Review of Indus. Org. 53, 59 (2012).
127
Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 23.
128
HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 290-294.
129
Jones Day Commentary, China’s New Leniency Procedure in Cartel Investigations 1, 3 (Jan. 2011),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/bbcb36d6-d2de-434a-ae9668f0fe327dc1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c1fad76f-259b-41ad-9b796919f502c10d/China%20New%20Leniency%20Procedure.pdf; See also HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 293.
130
Jones Day Commentary, supra note 129, at 3.
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and all subsequent undertakings may receive a reduction of up to 50%.”131 Furthermore, the
NDRC-DPS’s program does not apparently preclude granting leniency to the initiator of a
monopoly agreement.132 On the other hand, the SAIC-AMAUCEB’s leniency program does not
provide graduated penalties for entities that report an antitrust violation following the initial
disclosure, nor does it grant a monopoly agreement initiator any leniency.133
These inconsistencies, coupled with the unclear jurisdiction of these two AMEAs, may
discourage self-reporting by businesses involved in monopoly agreements. A business
participating in an antitrust violation would only disclose its conduct if it could benefit from this
leniency program, but the circumstances under which an entity would benefit from this program
are not easy to determine. For example, if a monopoly-initiator wanted to disclose its antitrust
conduct and benefit from the leniency program, it would want to frame the cartel’s conduct as
price-related, because it might benefit from the immunity provision within the NDRC-DPS’s
leniency program. This entity would most likely not want its activity framed as non-price related
because it would risk falling under the jurisdiction of the SAIC-AMAUCEB, and as monopolyinitiator it would be ineligible for leniency. If this monopoly-initiator is unsure whether the
NDRC-DPS will grant leniency, and knows that the SAIC-AMAUCEB will not grant leniency to
a monopoly-initiator, the monopoly-imitator may choose not to disclose its conduct, despite the
existence of a program that is supposed to encourage disclosure. Therefore, because the tripartite
enforcement structure allows the AMEAs discretion in applying the AML’s leniency program,
this structure may actually discourage the use of a seemingly beneficial program. It does not
seem that businesses are using the leniency program, which makes it difficult to determine

131

Norton Rose Group, supra note 9, at 23.
Id.
133
Id. at 24; See also HARRIS, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 293.
132
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whether they are adopting a “wait and see approach” as to the program’s application, or whether
the program’s inconsistencies discourage disclosing violations of antitrust conduct.134
b. Under-resources ministries
Dividing enforcement of the AML among three ministries means that these antitrust
departments compete with other ministry departments for resources. It has been noted that the
antitrust offices of each AMEA are under resourced.135
Each AMEA likely engages in similar steps in its initial investigation on antitrust behavior,
regardless of whether the conduct is price or non-price conduct, or related to a business
transaction.136 These steps include defining the relevant market involved, identifying the
market’s consumers and substitutes of the good available to the consumers, and determining
whether the entities involved have market power.137 Assuming that each AMEA follows this
process for its investigation then there is a duplication of these initial investigative steps across
the three AMEAs. Although these offices are expected to expand to include more staff and
better resources, this does not take away from the fact that this particular duplication, a result of
the tripartite structure, exists and is a waste of resources.138
Insufficiently resourced ministries also seem to affect how quickly the MOFCOM-AMB can
process its caseload. This bureau recently announced that it would develop a fast-track review
process in response to criticisms that it takes too long to review proposed mergers and

134

Anti-Competitive Conduct in China: A Dialogue with NDRC and SAIC Officials on Enforcement Under China’s
Anti-Monopoly Law, ANTITRUST LAW BLOG (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/2012/09/articles/article/anticompetitive-conduct-in-china-a-dialogue-with-ndrcand-saic-officials-on-enforcement-under-chinas-antimonopoly-law/.
135
Su et al., supra note 15, at 226-227; See also Agencies walk a fine line, supra note 99.
136
Grobowski et al., supra note 70.
137
Id.
138
China’s anti-monopoly law regime dissected, supra note 111.
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acquisitions.139 Apparently this delay is due to lack of resources to process merger notifications
more quickly.140
Therefore, enforcing the AML through three under-resourced ministries has two important
effects: first it leads to duplicative efforts, which may actually waste resources, and second, it
may reduce an AMEA’s caseload capacity at any given time.
c. Concurrent enforcement of pre-AML competition laws
This tripartite structure may also discourage application of the AML by the AMEAs
themselves. It has been suggested that the NDRC and the SAIC, which have jurisdiction to
enforce the Price Law and the AUCL respectively, may choose to enforce the laws with which
they are more familiar over the AML.141 Using the NDRC-DPS as an example, it applied the
Price Law and the AML in a cartel investigation among rice noodles producers in the Guangxi
province, and in an investigation concerning meetings on price increases with respect to
paperboard packaging.142 These ministries may choose to apply different laws for two reasons:
first, because they are more familiar with this other law, and second, because the AMEAs would
then not be “subject to the supervision” of the AMC under this other law.143 This outcome may
have two adverse effects on the development of the AML. First, it may provide a source of
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confusion for individuals attempting to predict how the AML will be applied, because they are
not sure it will even be applied if the AMEA has the option to apply a separate law. Second if
these ministries choose to apply laws in lieu of the AML because they are more familiar with
these other laws, when will they begin to transition to using the AML? The drafting period, the
adoption of the AML, and its potential to create a comprehensive competition law playing field
could be rendered ineffective if two out of the three AMEAs choose not to enforce the law
because they have sole jurisdiction over, and are more familiar with, a different competition law.
Therefore, it is possible that by giving ministries the ability to concurrently enforce the laws that
are similar but different to the AML, there may be a discouraged or reduced use of the AML.
However, this deduction could be illusory as there may be many cases in which these two
AMEAs applied the AML but did not publish their findings, and therefore the public is unaware
that the AML is in fact being applied regularly. Also, these two bureaus are still becoming
accustomed to applying the AML to competitive conduct in China.
It does not seem that the provisions enforced by the MOFCOM before the AML was enacted
create the same confusion. This is likely because MOFCOM modified these provisions to align
with those of the AML’s merger control regime.144 In July 2009, after the AML was enacted, the
2006 M&A Provisions (under MOFCOM’s responsibility) were amended to conform to the
merger regime of the AML.145 This ensured that “foreign buyers would be subject to only one
competition notification and review requirement, that under the AML.”146
IV.

Institutional Reform Recommendation
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The purpose of this paper is to provide an institutional reform recommendation by
identifying inefficiencies in the AML’s administrative enforcement structure.147 With the
inefficiencies of this structure in mind, this section outlines a two-step institutional reform that
would reduce these inefficiencies by empowering the AMC. The first step requires promoting
the AML to a ministry, and the second step requires placing the three AMEAs under the
promoted AMC. Because this suggestion is somewhat aspirational given China’s political
culture, this section also describes likely obstacles to this suggestion, and provides tools that may
be used to overcome them.
a. Institutional Reform: Empowering the AMC
Enforcing the AML through one institution borrows an idea largely developed in the first
group of literature, that the AML should be enforced through a single, independent, institution.148
If the law could not be enforced through one institution when the law was passed in 2007, why
could, and should, it be enforced through one institution today? Specifically, why should a new
actor, the AMC, be given the role of enforcing an increasingly powerful law?
China’s competition law landscape has significantly changed since the AML was enacted in
2008. First, unlike in 2008, there now exists four experienced AML bodies, the AMC, that is
tasked with developing a competition culture for China’s socialist market economy, and the three
antitrust departments of the AMEAs. All four bodies have almost five years of work experience
with the AML. If in 2008 the AML’s jurisdiction was divided among the three ministries that
had previously enforced China’s competition law because they had the most familiarity in
working with a competition law, it is not implausible to consider reallocating this jurisdiction to
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a government body whose responsibility is to promote a domestic competition culture.
Additionally, the AML is supposed to be China’s “economic constitution.”149 As such, its
importance should be reflected in China’s bureaucratic structure, and not buried in the hierarchy
of existing ministries as it is currently, thereby reducing its effectiveness.150
In order for the AMC to take the lead in antitrust development and enforce the AML, it needs
to be promoted to a higher government position than the one it currently holds. Its current form
does not enable it to enforce the law. Nor does its current form indicate that it is leading antitrust
development in China, even though it was recently promoted to a formal institution, because
most of its work occurs through meetings with its members.151 Using the promotion of the
National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) to the State Environmental Protection
Administration in March 1998 as an example, perhaps by promoting the AMC to a ministry, the
central government will signal that antitrust is one of its priorities, and that there is a body which
will take the lead in this area. Prior to 1998 NEPA was a sub-ministry.152 This promotion
apparently revealed that “the central government has given priority to environmental
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protection.”153 In a similar fashion, promoting the AMC to a ministry may indicate that antitrust
enforcement is a new priority for China’s government.
After promoting the AMC to a ministry, it would have to be restructured because it currently
is a commission consisting of representatives from existing ministries.154 It does not appear to
have the necessary tools, such as offices or officers to carry out investigations, to enforce the
AML. Therefore, the second step of this reform requires removing the three AMEAs from under
the umbrellas of the MOFCOM, the NDRC, and the SAIC, and placing them under the promoted
AMC. The latter would then enforce the AML through the AMEAs, which have institutional
knowledge of antitrust law enforcement given their experience under the abovementioned
ministries. Additionally, a commissioner, or minister, and supporting staff would need to be
designated and assigned to this empowered AMC.
There is precedent for reorganizing government departments in such a fashion in China’s
bureaucratic history. For instance MOFCOM was formed after the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC)
were merged in March 2003.155 The new ministry allowed responsibility for foreign and
domestic trade to be housed under one body by combining MOFTEC with parts of SETC and the
State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) in order to “streamline bureaucratic approval
requirements.”156 As of late 2007, the majority of departments in MOFCOM had been
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transferred “intact’ from MOFTEC, while a handful were from the SETC and SDPC.157 Another
and more recent example of reorganizing agencies under a government entity occurred with
respect to China’s maritime agencies.158 In March 2013 the National People’s Congress
approved a plan to house four of China’s five maritime agencies under the State Oceanic
Administration, in an attempt to improve coordination and reduce waste of resources among the
agencies.159
Lastly, to allocate enforcement authority to the AMC legislatively, the State Council could
delegate this authority pursuant to Article 9, “The State Council will set up the Anti-Monopoly
Commission (“AMC”), which is responsible for organizing, […], and other functions specified
by the State Council.”160 Alternatively, although redundant, the State Council could designate
the AMC as the sole AMEA, thus allowing the AMC to enforce the law pursuant to Article 10,
“The Anti-monopoly Enforcement Authority designated by the State Council to undertake the
responsibilities of the AML enforcement […] is responsible for the enforcement of the AntiMonopoly Law.”161
b. Benefits of this institutional reform
Promoting the AMC in this fashion may reduce some of the enforcement system’s current
inefficiencies. This reform may provide a clearer direction of the AML’s future, remove current
duplicative efforts among the antitrust bureaus, remove the need to coordinate antitrust
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enforcement among three institutions, and encourage the adoption of one leniency program and
requirement to publish decisions on antitrust matters.
Currently, the tripartite structure may reflect a mixed message about the government’s views
on the future of antitrust law in China: it wants to promote a competition culture through the
AMC, but enforce the law responsible for regulating competitive behavior through three separate
ministries that have different priorities with respect to China’s economic development. By
shifting enforcement of the AML to the AMC, a clearer direction of the AML may emerge
because the body responsible for promoting a competition culture, the AMC, would also be
responsible for enforcing the law that regulates competition behavior.
As stated previously, the current system delegates antitrust matters among the ministries
based on competition jurisdiction that existed prior to the AML. These ministries are
understaffed and under-resourced, and may be engaging in duplicative efforts with respect to
AML investigations. By placing these departments under the AMC, which would only handle
antitrust matters, these offices would no longer have to compete with other ministry departments
for resources. Consequently, the duplicative efforts that existed before may disappear, reducing
waste of resources. Additionally, the empowered AMC, being only one ministry with one
priority, may be able to increase the number of antitrust cases reviewed under the AML.
Placing these three bureaus under the AMC may have additional positive spillover effects,
such as encouraging a uniform application of the AML’s leniency program, or requiring
transparency with respect to AML decisions. However, these spillover effects may depend on
whether the ministry practices disappear when the departments are moved to the AMC. If the
ministry labels are removed when these offices are unified under the promoted AMC, the
inconsistent leniency programs and publishing requirements may also be removed. A different
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practice regarding administrative practice may be encouraged, such as the implementation of one
leniency program, and the requirement to publish decisions of all antitrust matters.
An additional advantage to enforcing the AML through the AMC is that it would remove the
uncertainty created by having multiple competition laws enforceable by numerous AMEAs.
Because the NDRC and the SAIC can enforce the Price Law and AUCL respectively, they may
choose not to enforce the AML in a particular antitrust matter.162 The advantage of enforcing the
AML through a ministry-level AMC is that the possibility of applying a law other than the AML
to antitrust matters would not exist. Furthermore, enforcing the AML through the AMC would
erase the current question of overlapping jurisdiction concern. If the promoted AMC has sole
jurisdiction over the AML, then the risk of a second ministry investigating antitrust conduct
would be removed. This does not mean that other ministries would not assist the AMC, nor that
other competition laws would be repealed. This restructuring would only signal that once the
AMC investigates anticompetitive conduct, only its offices would do so within the confines of
the AML, not other ministries.
One might argue that a structural reform empowering the AMC is not necessary to remove
improve the AML’s administrative enforcement. One suggestion has been to improve the
AMC’s coordination activities among the AMEAs.163 The suggestion proffered in this paper is
made in light of the fact that currently the AMC does not appear sufficiently powerful to
coordinate enforcement activities, which may be a result of its current structure, which includes a
number of representatives from the MOFCOM, the NDRC, and the SAIC. Given the
bureaucratic competition in China, which is addressed in the next section, the current structure of
the AMC itself may discourage coordination among the AMEAs because ministries do not want
162
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to share jurisdiction over the AML. One might also argue that most enforcement inefficiencies
stem mainly from the NDRC-DPS and the SAIC-AMAUCEB. Therefore, one might suggest
that only these two bureaus should be merged into one bureau that would enforce the AML in
conjunction with the MOFCOM-AMB. The difficulty with this proposition is that a decision
would still have to be made as to which ministry would oversee the merged department. Would
the MOFCOM, the SAIC, or the NDRC have responsibility for this department? This might lead
to a situation similar to that before the AML was enacted where ministries refused to cede their
jurisdiction to an existing ministry. Therefore, although this is an alternative, it may create
implementation problems similar to those that arose in 2007.
Lastly, this reform streamlines the AML’s administrative enforcement structure. It would not
only reduce current inefficiencies, but would also be a place of reference for the legal and
business community on anti-monopoly matters. Complaints, investigations, referrals, would all
go to this new AMC. Regulations, guidelines, and provisions about the law, would all be issued
through this empowered AMC. This streamlined result aligns with two of the priorities
announced by China’s new premier, Li Keqiang. 164 In March 2013 the country’s new leaders
stated their goal to reduce government excess at the ministerial level and the possibility of doing
so by consolidating a number of bureaus under one administration.165
Therefore, restructuring the current institutional structure so that the AML is enforced
through an empowered AMC would improve enforcement efficiency for three reasons: it would
remove duplicative investigations and jurisdictional concerns, increase resources available for
antitrust review, encourage transparency, and provide better reflection of the AML’s position in
China.
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c. Possible hurdles in implementing this institutional reform
i. Administrative hurdles
Government restructuring is an expensive endeavor, and China’s government has changed its
organization multiple times over the years.166 Unlike China’s maritime agencies which appear
uncoordinated at a time when foreign policy requires a unified maritime policy, AML
enforcement exists, delivers results, and is adapting to some of the legal community’s needs.
However, it can be made more efficient for lawyers to navigate. Therefore, unlike other areas of
government interest, antitrust enforcement may not be as high a priority on the government’s list
of priorities, and therefore may not require restructuring today.
Also, if this reform is adopted, additional structural changes may have to occur. The State
Council would have to determine whether the AMC as a ministry should have local and
provincial branches, and if so, be allowed to delegate investigative and enforcement authority to
these branches, similar to the current application of the AML by the SAIC-AMAUCEB and the
NDRC-DPS. Alternatively, the ministry-level AMC could pursue the same direction as the
MOFCOM-AMB, and only enforce the AML through a centralized bureau. Additionally, the
new AMC would have to determine its internal structure once the AMEAs are placed under its
supervision. It might be best to have one department handle preliminary investigations into all
antitrust matters, and create another three departments that would examine price related conduct,
non-price related conduct, and proposed business transactions. These particular issues highlight
that the institutional reform does not stop after the two steps highlighted above. Further
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considerations and steps must be taken into account, all of which would not necessary if the
enforcement structure remains unchanged.
ii. Resistance from the current AMEAs and the State Council
There is considerable bureaucratic competition among the ministries in China that creates the
need for entities “to assert jurisdiction over the same issue,” partly in order to achieve
recognition from other government officials and partly because of China’s political culture.167 In
light of the AML’s legislative history and AMEAs resistance to cede enforcement to one
institution in 2007, the current AMEAs will most likely resist any decision that allows the
institutional reform suggested above to proceed. Informing the MOFCOM, the NDRC, and the
SAIC that their jurisdiction over the AML will be removed and allocated to an empowered AMC
in which they will not have the same representation will likely lead to these ministries resisting
to agree to this reform. Therefore certain bargaining chips, outlined below, would have to be
provided to these ministries in an attempt to persuade them to cede their AML responsibilities to
the AMC.
First, it would be important to highlight that the AMC is only taking the lead on AML
enforcement to simplify enforcement and development of the law; and that it would still require
assistance from the AMEAs in developing China’s competition policy. The AMC could indicate
to these ministries that it would still require their input to ensure that competition law develops in
line with the economic development of the country (the responsibility of the NDRC) and the
administration of consumer protection (one of the SAIC’s responsibilities).168
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Second, these ministries would have to be reassured that their prior AML involvement in
competition would remain intact. The MOFCOM, for example, could still retain jurisdiction
over reviewing those mergers that do not fall under the AML’s characteristics for merger
notification requirements.169 Additionally, the NDRC and the SAIC could retain jurisdiction
over the Price Law and AUCL respectively, since they are supposed to be applied in a different
context than the AML. However, despite these suggestions that would allow these three
ministries to continue playing a role in the development of China’s “economic constitution,” it
must be acknowledged that this institutional reform suggestion would remove the largest
component through which these entities exert their influence: enforcement of the AML.170 As
such, it may be very difficult to persuade these ministries to cede their responsibilities in a timely
manner.
The State Council also has a voice in empowering the AMC because pursuant to Article 9 of
the AML, the State Council is responsible for establishing the AMC.171 Because the State
Council may wish to control the development of China’s antitrust legislation, and because it
must develop the country’s socialist market economy, it may view empowering the AMC as a
step away from this economic policy. Although this empowered AMC would still be
subordinate to the State Council, ministries can still influence policy goals.172 As such, the State
Council may be reluctant to place the AML, which seems to be an increasingly important law in
China, in the hands of one single ministry that will have one goal, to develop China’s economic
competition policy. It is this author’s opinion that the current structure allows ministries
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involved in China’s economic development to influence the development of the AML so that
China’s competition policy conforms to its market economy. As such, the State Council may not
wish to empower the AMC because in doing so China’s economic competition policy may
develop in a different direction, away from the country’s market economy policy.
Furthermore, this recommendation is only a structural recommendation. It does not address
the relationship between the AML and state-owned enterprises or administrative monopolies in
China, which itself may require a different and deeper reform. Along the same vein, this
suggestion still places AML enforcement under the State Council. Therefore AML enforcement
would still be subject to the oversight of the State Council, which still does not allow for a truly
independent antitrust enforcement structure.
V.

Conclusion

The AML has grown to become an important piece of legislation since it became effective on
August 1, 2008. It has grown from a document that generated debate as to its effectiveness, to a
law with a power that causes companies operating in China and negotiating mergers and
acquisitions outside of China to rethink their business strategies.173
The AML’s current administrative enforcement structure was established so that the law
would be promulgated quickly and without much change to the existing government structure,
which in 2007 did not include an experienced entity devoted only to competition development in
China’s socialist market economy. Although this structure was possibly necessary in 2007 so
that the AML law would be enacted, it is not without its disadvantages. First, it creates
uncertainty because China’s bureaucratic competitiveness does not seem to encourage
173

Susan Ning and Hazel Yin, China’s anti-monopoly law: retrospect and prospect on fourth anniversary,
LEXOLOGY (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a987eb78-d79b-46c0-a024d61f687e947b.

38

Fulena, Yasmine
Law 9613 Final Draft 4.26.2013

coordination, and the AMC does not seem to require coordination on certain aspects of the law,
such as decision publication or application of the leniency program. Second, it forces the
AMEAs’ antitrust departments responsible for enforcing China’s “economic constitution” to
compete with other ministry departments for resources. Lastly, it may discourage the application
of the AML to anticompetitive matters because the NDRC and the SAIC may apply previous
competition laws instead of the AML to anticompetitive behavior.
In light of China’s “streamlining drive,” this paper seeks to identify inefficiencies in the
AML’s administrative enforcement structure to demonstrate that this particular area is ripe for
reform.174 Moreover, this paper outlines a two-part institutional reform that may reduce these
inefficiencies. By promoting the AMC to a ministerial-level, the government would signal the
AML’s importance in China’s economic policy. By reallocating the AMEAs’ antitrust bureaus
to a ministry-level AMC, this new body could use the institutional knowledge gained by the
AMEAs while they were housed under the MOFCOM, the NDRC, and the SAIC, to enforce the
AML.
These recommendations will have their own challenges. Government restructuring is an
expensive endeavor, and it will be difficult to convince the AMEAs to cede their jurisdiction
under the AML to an empowered AMC. They did not want to do this during the AML’s drafting
period, and there is little indication that they would agree to this proposition now because of the
importance the AML is likely to take in the China’s future.175 Despite offering certain incentives
that allow these ministries to maintain a say in China’s antitrust development, because of the
strong competitiveness that exists among China’s ministries it is unlikely that these three
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ministries will accept these bargaining chips because they do not make up for the fact that these
ministries would no longer enforce the AML.176
It should also be noted that reform of the AML’s administrative enforcement structure is
likely not on the government’s agenda because the current enforcement structure does deliver
results: mergers have been blocked or conditioned, and firms have been found violating
provisions of the AML. Lastly, the AML is still in its infancy, and developments are still
occurring under this system, as demonstrated by the AMEAs decision to disclose their case load
earlier this year. Therefore a structural reform might not be necessary; the AMEAs may just
need time to mature.
To conclude, although the current enforcement structure delivers results, it may be difficult
for the public, lawyers and businesses in particular, to navigate because it is divided among three
ministries that seem to have three different enforcement practices. The inefficiencies examined
in this paper, and the suggested institutional reform, only serve to highlight that the AML’s
administrative enforcement structure is an area that the Chinese government may wish to
consider in its overall plan to streamline the country’s government structure.
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